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Sikkerhed i verden - Krig mod terror?Fragments of the “war on terror”Paul Rogers, 25. august 2005 In his 200th global security column, Paul Rogers highlights five seminal events in the first four years of a long war. Soon after the 11 September 2001 attacks, Anthony Barnett suggested I
contribute a short piece to openDemocracy about the impending war in
Afghanistan. In the next few days a great deal more happened, so a second column
followed a week later. Now, 200 weeks and nearly four years afterwards, the series
continues – as does fighting in Afghanistan, and Iraq. These global security columns have tried to track the developments of
President Bush's global “war on terror" by recording and assessing its
major events: the termination of the Taliban regime; the defining of the "axis
of evil" and the requirement for pre-emption; the attacks in Bali,
Casablanca, Madrid, London and a score of other places; and, above all, the
first two and half years of the Iraq war. Instead of an overview of the past four years, perhaps it is worth picking
out five individual events that cast light on the longer-term trends now
unfolding. These incidents, whether noteworthy or neglected at the time, have
since proved pivotal in their consequences and implications. November 2001: the liberation of Kabul The war to terminate the Taliban regime seemed to be going very slowly after
several weeks of fighting, with little sign of a collapse despite heavy bombing
and substantial rearmament by the United States of its Northern Alliance allies. Overnight, however, Kabul fell, and the regime disappeared as if it had never
existed. By December 2001, the Taliban seemed already to belong to the past, and
George W Bush could make his State
of the Union speech a month later on a note of triumph. The moment was shortlived, as intense fighting in Tora Bora showed a
determined guerrilla force that would prove to be a major problem for the United
States and its coalition partners. More than three years later, the US leads a
force of 20,000 troops in Afghanistan still trying to control a persistent
insurgency (see “Between
Iraq and Afghanistan”, 9 June 2005). This should not have come as a surprise. The liberation of Kabul was not
accomplished by a siege or by violent military combat – the Taliban simply
melted away into Afghan and Pakistani towns and villages, usually with weapons
and supplies intact. In one sense, this was a defeat for the Taliban, but in another it was only a
stage in a longer-term confrontation (see “Breakthrough
– to a broader war?”, 19 November 2001) . March 2003: the start of the Iraq war Many observers saw the destruction of Saddam Hussein's statue on 9 April 2003
as the Iraq war’s culminating moment. This was a gross misreading. A few
analysts reported that crowds were in the hundreds, not thousands, and that a US
military vehicle had actually toppled the statue. The widely ridiculed Iraqi
information minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf ("Comical
Ali") was disturbingly prescient in warning the newly occupying US
forces: "we will bury you". This was, after all, only the initial three-week phase in the ongoing Iraq
war. A more accurate image from this period was an account by BBC correspondent
Adam Mynott as he crossed the border from Kuwait with a US unit on the first
morning after the bombardment; he "came on air breathless from having to
take cover as the convoy he was with faced up to small arms and rocket attack
from Iraqi forces" (see “The
quicksand of war”, 24 March 2003). George W Bush's "mission accomplished" address on the aircraft
carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on 1
May 2003 is perhaps the most spectacular misjudgement of this period. It
took months before the US-led coalition acknowledged the scale of the insurgency
it was facing, and more than a year before the Coalition Provisional Authority
stopped describing its enemy as "remnants". July 2003: the Indian refusal By July 2003, the Iraqi insurgency was developing in strength, even as the
United States was beginning to establish permanent bases in the country. Already,
there were problems of overstretch within the US armed forces and it was
becoming essential to persuade other countries to share the military costs of
occupation. The US faced a series of obstacles: in Europe, the few countries with the
capacity to contribute large numbers of troops were firmly opposed to doing so;
the Turkish
parliament voted against assisting the US effort; middle-eastern regimes
were deeply reluctant to get involved; almost all other potential US allies
lacked the numbers of deployable, fully-trained professional troops required. India was the exception, and the United States exerted heavy pressure to
persuade the Delhi government to commit a full division of 17,000 troops (see
“Far from
home, alone”, 17 July 2003). India’s then prime minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee may have been willing to do so, but the domestic political environment
simply did not allow it. Some opinion polls recorded more than 80% of Indians
vehemently against any deployment; this, coupled with impending elections in
five Indian states, was enough to kill the idea stone dead. In retrospect, this was one of the key events of the first thirty months of
the Iraq war. No Indian commitment meant that no other major troop offerings
were forthcoming. Instead, the last two years have seen a steady haemorrhaging
of support as country after country reduces or withdraws its detachments from
Iraq. November 2004: the bin Laden tape George W Bush's victory in the American presidential election of November
2004, in the midst of great military difficulties in Iraq, was seen as a
vindication of his Iraq policy in particular and the conduct of the global
“war on terror” in general. An event that preceded it may, in the longer
term, prove to be equally significant: the release of a video message from Osama
bin Laden. The al-Qaida leader appeared on this occasion in almost authoritative pose,
delivering from a lectern a wide-ranging address encompassing twenty-five years
of history, highlighting Iraq as the global jihad’s new theatre of
operations, and reinforcing perceptions of a "war for Arab oil". The significance of bin Laden’s speech and Bush’s electoral success is
that (as was suggested at the time – see “Four
more years for al-Qaida”, 4 November 2004):
"Both ‘sides’ need to present an image of al-Qaida as a powerful, unified and effective organisation. Osama bin Laden needs it to demonstrate his strength and authority, George W Bush needs it as a focus for his occupation of Iraq. In a sense, each needs the other. President Bush's re-election on 2 November 2004 is undoubtedly important for international relations in the next four years. So, in its own way, is bin Laden's videotaped message." November 2004: Fallujah The US election was immediately followed by the assault on Fallujah, born of
the US determination to erase what – since the intense fighting in April –
it saw as the most vital single focus of the entire Iraqi insurgency (see “Fallujah
fallout”, 11 November 2004). The city was severely damaged by a
devastating attack: more than 1,000 people were killed and around 200,000 were
forced to flee. The impact on the insurgency proved minimal, however, with
attacks being mounted in Mosul and elsewhere even before the Fallujah operation
was completed. Since then images of the destruction in the "city of mosques" have
had a profound resonance across the Islamic world, adding to anti-American
sentiments. Furthermore, tight security controls imposed by US and Iraqi forces
after its reoccupation have failed to prevent insurgents from reorganising and
mounting new operations. Of all the developments that this global security series has sought to
discuss and analyse, the Fallujah assault may well have the most enduring effect
in Iraq and the wider region. A personal note I hope you will not mind if I end this 200th column on a personal note. Although I take sole responsibility for these weekly contributions, they
would not be possible without the thoughts, comments and ideas of scores of
people and the work of countless journalists and analysts that provide such a
wide range of material. I would like to thank the many people who have commented
on the articles, including the highly critical and even the abusive – at least
they are stimulated to respond! Friends at the Oxford
Research Group have been a continual source of ideas and information, as
have staff and students at Bradford
University's department of peace studies – well over 400 people from over
forty countries with a quite extraordinary wealth of experience. Most of all, I must thank the staff at openDemocracy, including editor
Isabel Hilton, editor-in-chief Anthony Barnett (who started all this in the
first place), and especially deputy editor David Hayes. David usually gets my
"raw" contribution some time late on a Wednesday yet manages, with all
the other pressures, to edit it so that it appears on the web by Thursday
afternoon, much improved and with numerous added links as well. Thank you,
David.
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